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ABSTRACT:  This paper proposes an 
overlapping generations model along 
the lines of the papers by Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1997). Its aim is to provide a 
theoretical extension in which we establish, 
in an original framework, a comparison of 
public and private educational financing 
systems in terms of economic growth. The 
results provide a critique of the literature 
that suggests that private expenditure will 
inevitably lead to greater economic growth 
than a policy of public education.
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EDUCATION FINANCING AND GROWTH USING AN 
OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL:  
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE1. INTRODUCTION 
Faced with the inability of government to overcome certain economic problems, 
a wave of economists called for total withdrawal of the government and the 
need to adopt privatization policies. These allow the economy to function better, 
resulting in higher economic growth. However, an OECD study (2002) showed 
that the massive application of privatization in European countries led to a 
decline in growth from 2.4% in 1990 to 1.8% in 2002. The question that has to 
be asked is where we should stop the privatization process. In other words, do 
we have to substitute a private effort for the public effort and thus neglect the 
role of the state in all sectors? 
In this paper we focus on the education sector, the financing of which has been 
the subject of a polemical debate. Faced with the advantages of privatization, a 
set of economists supplied various economic models to try to confirm that 
private education is better than public education in terms of economic growth; 
for example, Cox and Jimenez (1990) and Epple and Romano (1997) . However, 
the different analytical frameworks considered retain extremely diagrammatic 
representations of the economy (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)), which leads us 
to question the established results concerning the superiority of the private 
system in the field of education. This review does not aim to reject the policy of 
private education but underlines that productive and quality public spending 
can doubtless improve the economic growth, especially as in some economic 
sectors such as education and health, total disengagement of the state can only 
widen social gaps, with a potential negative impact on economic growth. 
Like Glomm and Ravikumar (1992),in this paper we focus on the comparison 
between the two policies of public and private education in terms of growth. We 
retain a frame analysis similar to the paper by Glomm and Ravikumar (1997). 
However, Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) ignored the role of private education 
expenditure on economic growth. For this reason, we assume that parents agree 
to pay for their children to be educated in private schools and establish a trade 
balance between consumption and expenditure on the education of their 
children in the first period of life on the one hand, and consumption in the 
second period of life on the other. We show that, contrary to Glomm and 
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growth than a policy of privatization.  
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we provide a summary of the literature 
related to the issue of education policies and their effects on growth. Next, we 
present our model. The last section presents our contribution to the comparison 
of the two educational regimes in term of economic growth. 
2. THE PUBLIC / PRIVATE DEBATE 
A vast literature has focused on the importance of human capital investment in 
stimulating economic growth. Indeed, education is an essential element of 
economic and social development, establishing a means of directly increasing 
the welfare of the population and promoting economic growth in the long-term 
(Lucas 1988). This subject is accompanied by a set of works that try to 
determine how various policies affect human capital investment and therefore 
growth. Thus, many contributions have moved forward the debate on the socio 
economic consequences of public versus private education policies. 
Using World Bank data, Jimenez et al (1991) analyzed whether the privatization 
of the education system in Tanzania and Thailand caused more economic 
growth over time compared to the public education system. Furthermore, Khan 
and Kumar (1997) showed that the effects on economic growth of private and 
public education financing were significantly different in a sample of 95 
developing countries over the period 1970-1990. They found that private 
financing of education is consistently more productive than public financing of 
education.  
In the context of the overlapping generations models, almost all studies 
conclude that the private system is more efficient than the public system in 
terms of economic growth. For example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) 
consider an overlapping generations model in which the accumulation of 
human capital depends on the length of training as well as education spending. 
They consider two systems of education. The first is purely private in which the 
education expenditure is individually assured by the parents. The second is 
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from a majority voting system carried out by parents. They show that the first 
system leads to a significant accumulation of human capital and a higher 
economic growth rate than the second. Similarly, Bénabou (1996) exploits an 
overlapping generations model in his work. He shows that private financing of 
education results in more economic growth through the generations than the 
public financing of education.  
The aim of this paper is to propose a comparison of the two policies of private 
and public education in terms of economic growth. This problem is borrowed 
from Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) who concluded in favour of a private 
education system. Our contribution consists in adopting a different frame work, 
similar to that of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), to establish completely 
different results. We adopt the overlapping generations model as an instrument 
of economic analysis. This type of modeling taking into account inter and intra 
generational interactions, is an interesting way to study the questions of human 
capital accumulation. It can also deal with macroeconomic issues without 
neglecting the microeconomic foundation. 
3. THE MODEL 
3.1. Characteristic of the population 
Following the example of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), we consider an 
overlapping generations economy where individuals live through two periods. 
Each period is normalized in one. In every period a fixed continuum of agent is 
born. The size of the population is constant and it is normalized in one. In the 
first period of life, the agents dedicate their time to work and receive in return a 
wage proportional to their human capital endowment. In the second period, 
individuals retire and their consumption is ensured by their savings from the 
previous period.  
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The production is assured by means of the human capital  ) ( t h  and physical 
capital  ) ( t k  according on the technology production of Cobb-Douglas 
following: 
   
1 ) ( t t t h Ak Y
 
(1) 
A is a parameter of productivity 
 is the elasticity of physical capital 
  1  is the elasticity of human capital. 
Moreover, the accumulation of physical capital is described by the following 
dynamic equation:  t k t t k I k ) 1 ( 1      , with  k   a the rate of capital 
depreciation. As in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar, we suppose that the 
depreciation of the physical capital is total, returning us to the following 
equality:  t t I k  1  
3.3. Policy of public education 
Following the example of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), we suppose that the 
decisions of every agent consist in establishing the optimal division between the 
consumption of the first period and the consumption of the second period of 
life. That’s why, the function of intertemporal utility of the representative agent 
is of log linear type and it is given by the following expression:  
1 1) , (     t t t t Inc Inc c c U    (2) 
1 0     indicates the preference for this agent 
t c  is the level of consumption in the first period of life 
1  t c  is the level of consumption in the second period of life 
The government takes a tax   to finance public expenditure on education. 
Thus, the two budget constraints of the agents are written as follows: 
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t t t s r c ) ) 1 ( 1 ( 1 1         (4) 
t w is the wage per unit of effective labor. 
t s is the level of savings. 
The accumulation of human capital depends primarily on two factors. The first 
factor is the cultural heritage that allows everyone to benefit from the human 
capital of its ascendancy. The second factor represents the public spending in 
education. Thus, the human capital accumulation is represented as follows: 
  
     
1
1 1 1 1 ) , ( t t t t t E Bh E h H h   (5) 
B is a technological or productivity parameter . 
1  t h  corresponds to the cultural heritage. 
1  t E  represent the public spending on education. 
  corresponds to the elasticity of the cultural heritage. 
The balance of the state budget implies equality between revenue collection and 
provided education expenditure. Hence, the following equation: 
t t t t t E k r h w   ) (   
The objective of the individual is to maximize its intertemporal utility and to 
choose the equilibrium distribution of net income between the savings that 
serve for consumption during retirement and consumer spending in the first 
period. The resolution of the programme of the representative agent allows us 
then to write the expression of the savings as follows:  
) 1 (
) 1 (

 



t t
t
h w
s  (6) 
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Proposition 1: Growth factor converges to a constant. We show that this 
constant is given by: 
)
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The proof is presented in the appendix. 
Therefore, public expenditure on education have has positive effects in the 
short- and long- term. Under the overlapping generations model, this means 
that public expenditure on education has resulted in psitive intra effects among 
individuals born in the same period. In addition, public spending on education 
accounted for favorable long-term effects, which means that there is an 
intergenerational effect. Indeed, public expenditure on education plays the role 
of a positive externality in the economy over time and thus stimulates economic 
growth.  
Proposition 2: The maximum growth rate is reached when the tax rate is equal 
to the elasticity of human capital relative to production that is to say that 
    1 . 
The proof is presented in the appendix. 
3.4. Private education policy 
In this section, we deal with private education policy, according to which 
parents, motivated by altruism, undertake to finance the learning of their 
descendants. So, the decisions of every individual consist in establishing a 
balance between his/her consumption in the first period and the spending on 
his/her children’s education on the one hand, and consumption in the second 
period of life on the other. Therefore, the intertemporal utility function of the 
representative individual is:  
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where  t e  represents private spending on education made by parents for their 
children.  
In this new context, budget constraints come down to the following two 
equations:  
t t t t t h w e s c      (9) 
t t t s r c ) 1 ( 1 1       (10) 
Thus, the optimization programme of the agent and the new first order 
conditions allow us to achieve the following equilibrium equations: 
t t t h w e
 

2
1
 
t t t h w c
 

2
1
  
t t t h w s




2   
Finally, the human capital accumulation is performed as follows:  
  
     
1
1 1 1 1 ) , ( t t t t t e Bh e h H h   (11) 
We follow the same approach as in the previous section and we determine that 
the expression of the growth rate from the report 
t
t
k
k 1   is to be noted  private  .  
Proposition 3: A Growth rate converges towards a constant. After taking 
everything into account, we show that: 
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(12) 
The proof is presented in the appendix. 
4. COMPARISON OF TWO EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 
We distinguish two economies which start with the same economic 
characteristics. The first is characterized by a system of public education. The 
government is responsible for collecting taxes from households to fund the 
education system. The second is characterized by a withdrawal of government, 
and therefore by a system of private education. It is assumed that the production 
technology of education is equivalent from one system to another. The issue 
here is to compare the two education policies in terms of economic growth. For 
this, we establish a comparison between the two growth rates presented by 
equations (7) and (12). We then calculate the ratio 
private
public

  
Proposition 4:  
For,  and  (between 0 and 1) given, the economy described above with a 
public education policy results in more economic growth than that with a 
private education policy. 
The proof is presented in the appendix. 
So, public spending plays the role of a positive externality in the economy and 
contributes to economic growth. The intervention of the government through 
public spending on education reduces the cost of training opportunities, makes 
education more attractive, and results in a greater incentive for education. In 
addition, it helps to promote capital accumulation, so that economic is higher in 
the long run. Therefore, our contribution provides a critique of previous results 
in the literature that consider private spending to have a greater effect on 
economic growth than government spending.  
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We propose an overlapping generations model with both human capital and 
physical capital. The accumulation of human capital is a function of cultural 
heritage as well as expenses incurred by the State or by parents for education. 
The accumulation of human capital is a function of cultural heritage as well as 
educational spending by the government or parents. If spending on education is 
provided by parents (supposed to be altruistic), then the system of education is 
private. Otherwise, the government agrees to fund education and it is question 
of public policy.  
Almost all theoretical models existing in the literature attempt to show that 
private education policies are more favourable to economic growth than public 
education policies. 
However, this paper reaches a different result, based on the work of Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1997) but maintaining a generational approach to compare the two 
regimes of private and public education in terms of growth. We show that 
public spending can have the largest macroeconomic consequences at 
intergenerational and intragenerational levels. The result is mainly due to the 
choice of an imposition rate corresponding to the elasticity of human capital. 
Therefore, the choice of tax rates promotes the efficiency of the public 
educational system and leads to better growth. Thus, our contribution leads to a 
result different from the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Bénabou 
(1996), in which the public financing of education generates more economic 
growth than private financing. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of proposition 1 
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When this ratio converges to a steady state so we obtain: 
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Substituting the expression of this equation into the equation of the growth rate 
leads us to write the growth rate as follows: 
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Proof of proposition 2 
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When this ratio converges to a steady or stationary state, we obtain the 
following expression: 
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We replace the tax rate   by    1  in this report and we obtain:  
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Whatever the parameters  , and which are included between 0 and 1, we 
always have the term 
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